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Abstract.  Research that involves the creation of animals with 
human-derived parts opens the door to potentially valuable scientific 
and therapeutic advances, yet invokes unsettling moral 
questions.  Critics and champions alike stand to gain from clear 
identification and careful consideration of the strongest ethical 
objections to this research. A prevailing objection argues that 
crossing the human/nonhuman species boundary introduces 
inexorable moral confusion (IMC) that warrants a restriction to this 
research on precautionary grounds. Though this objection may 
capture the intuitions of many who find this research unsettling, it 
relies on mistaken views of both biology and moral standing, 
ultimately distorting the morally relevant facts.  We critically examine 
IMC, identify mistaken essentialist assumptions, and reframe ethical 
concerns.  The upshot is a stronger line of objection that encourages 
a more inclusive and productive ethical discourse. 
Keywords: Part-Human; Chimera; Research Ethics; Species; 
Bioethics; Stem Cell Ethics. 
1. Introduction 
Research that involves the creation of non-human animals with human-derived 
parts opens the door to valuable scientific and therapeutic advances, yet invokes 
unsettling moral questions.  A prevailing objection cautions against creating these 
individuals due to worries of the “inexorable moral confusion” (IMC) that may 
arise over their moral status (Robert and Baylis 2003). This objection frames the 
ethical issues as stemming from crossing species boundaries, notably the 
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than enlighten, the ethical discourse.  Crossing or blurring species boundaries, in 
and of itself, is not a compelling source of ethical concern.  Biological facts and 
theory fail to support the idea that species boundaries are fixed or carry any 
moral relevance (Karpowicz et al. 2004; Robert and Baylis 2003).  Here we seek 
to reframe the ethical discourse along more productive lines.  
We begin by recounting the structure of IMC arguments and articulating  
the subsequent motivations for adopting a precautionary attitude about human-
to-nonhuman cross-species research.  We argue that IMC arguments are 
undermined by core commitments to naïve developmental essentialism and to an 
incommensurable moral divide between humans and nonhumans, which distort 
the morally relevant facts.  We unpack these claims by considering what we call 
the two-essence problem, demonstrating that the motivating confusion is a 
product of the core IMC commitments.  This stands in contrast to what is 
generally taken to be the source of confusion: the (actual or potential) crossing of 
species boundaries.  
The payoff is a re-evaluation of the ethics of human-to-nonhuman 
interspecies research.  We suggest a way to reframe objections to the creation of 
animals with human-derived parts that avoid the troubling assumptions of IMC 
arguments while at the same time capturing the motivating intuitions.  The moral 
force of these objections turn on uncertainty about the moral status of the 
resulting creatures (reminiscent of Streiffer 2005), rather than confusion about 
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enough to trigger a prohibition on precautionary grounds may remain, but we 
suggest this is just the sort of disagreement worth having.  Moral disagreements, 
after all, may be fruitful even when consensus is absent and uncertainty remains. 
A word about terminology: although there are important distinctions to be 
drawn between chimeras, transgenic animals, hybrids, and other cross-species 
mixes (see Robert 2006), the ultimate target of IMC arguments may be any 
creature that results from novel combinations of human and nonhuman biological 
material in human-to-nonhuman interspecies research.  Different technologies 
imply different possibilities for combination, and what type of creature may result.  
However, these finer distinctions may be shelved for now.  We will adopt what we 
hope is a neutral terminology, referring directly to the creature or individual.  
When a predicate is needed, we will use ‘animal with human-derived parts’, 
‘human/non-human’ or ‘part-human’.  We acknowledge each is imperfect.  The 
first should be understood as referring to non-human animals, though, of course, 
that’s part of what is at stake.  Still, we think it reflects good recent practice, e.g., 
the “human neuron mouse” (Greely et al. 2007) would be described as a ‘mouse 
with human-derived neural tissue’, as opposed to a ‘mouse with human neurons’ 
(n.b. Academy of Medical Sciences 2011 and Benham and Haber 2008).  ‘Part-
human’ is particularly loaded and ambiguous.  Usage will be restricted to cases 
where (a) we wish to draw attention to the inherent tensions loaded into such 
terms; (b) using animal with human-derived parts would render a clause 
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these terms capture the general objects of concern in arguments from IMC, and 
avoid question begging unsettled biological and conceptual facts.  Indeed, it is 
the status of these facts that are themselves centrally morally relevant. 
Sound moral reasoning relies on considerations grounded in well-
formulated concerns that adequately identify the morally relevant facts at hand.  
Our re-framing of concerns regarding human-to-nonhuman interspecies research 
and therapy present stronger candidate lines of moral objection to that research. 
However, this identification of candidate objections should not be confused for 
endorsement—instead we offer a fruitful re-examination of the ethical landscape 
involved in interspecies research. 
2. Inexorable Moral Confusion 
Robert and Baylis (2003) sought to helpfully frame discussions on the ethics of 
human-to-nonhuman interspecies research.  Their aim was to capture what 
critics found morally troubling, and to identity the strongest objections to that 
research.  Their articulation has been deeply influential, and continues to be cited 
as a proxy for critics of interspecies research (see Bhan et al 2010, Chan 2009, 
Cohen and Majumder 2009, Coors et al. 2010, Grunwell 2009, Hug 2009, Hyun 
et al. 2007, among others).  They proposed that the strongest objection stems 
from what they label “the argument from inexorable moral confusion” (IMC).  
Namely, the crossing of species boundaries threatens established and important 
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that a precautionary attitude is warranted, justifying a halt to (or at least major 
restrictions on) such research (p. 9): 
All things considered, the engineering of creatures that are part human 
and part nonhuman animal is objectionable because the existence of 
such beings would introduce inexorable moral confusion in our existing 
relationships with nonhuman animals and in our future relationships 
with part-human hybrids and chimeras. 
Robert and Baylis do not endorse this argument, and go so far as to actively 
deny its efficacy (see also Baylis and Robert 2007; Baylis 2008).  Yet they 
recommend further discussion of the concerns raised, noting that worries over 
transgressing the human/nonhuman species boundaries underwrites these and 
many other concerns. Given IMC’s status as a prevailing critical view, a response 
is warranted. 
Though Robert and Baylis develop a number of ideas encapsulated in the 
argument from IMC, here we focus on two key claims: the generation of moral 
confusion, and consequences of that confusion.  Mixing biological material from 
human and nonhuman animals to produce novel creatures, it is said, generates a 
troubling moral confusion—a confusion that is inexorable, i.e., unavoidable and 
irresolvable.  In particular, this research involves crossing fundamental species 
boundaries, mixing categorically distinct species, thus producing an irresolvable 
confusion about what species the resulting creature belongs to.  This is 
particularly troubling due to a presumption of IMC arguments that belonging to 
Homo sapiens is a necessary condition for full moral standing.  In contrast, the 
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other than species identity, e.g., its value to humans.  On the argument from IMC, 
these two moral frameworks are incommensurable and introduce an irresolvable 
confusion: if creatures are made that contain a combination of human and 
nonhuman biological material, the means by which we determine the moral 
status of the resulting creature is fundamentally unsettled. Thus, “It follows that 
hybrids and chimeras made from human materials are threatening insofar as 
there is no clear way of understanding (or even imagining) our moral obligations 
to these beings” (Robert and Baylis 2003, 9).  
On IMC arguments, the consequences of this moral confusion are 
profound: undermining the categorical divide between human and nonhuman 
animals challenges the very nature of moral justification. To challenge this divide 
is to threaten the claim that “humanness is a necessary (if not sufficient) 
condition for full moral standing” (Robert and Baylis 2003, p. 2). The threat, in a 
very real sense, is existential.  The divide maintains, and perhaps even 
establishes, human biological and moral identity. Thus, proponents of IMC 
arguments adopt a precautionary stance: until the moral confusion is resolved, 
the potential consequences justify preventing (or severely restricting) human-to-
nonhuman interspecies research.  However, on the assumption that the 
confusion is inexorable, a resolution is unlikely and the precautionary approach 
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3. Sources of Confusion 
For IMC arguments to be effective they must correctly identify the source 
of moral confusion and the consequences that justify prohibition. IMC arguments 
fail on both counts.  Let’s first consider the purported source of moral confusion. 
For crossing species boundaries to generate an inexorable moral confusion, 
moral categories must closely track biological ones.  Otherwise the putative 
threat dissipates and the worry about moral confusion falls flat.  However, this 
connection between moral and biological status is problematic (to say the least), 
involving essentialist thinking about biological species (and subsequent effect on 
moral status) that is not simply unsupported, but undermined, by empirical facts 
(n.b., Hull 1986). This is widely recognized, and even Robert and Baylis (2003) 
note that this essentialism is not well founded. Yet, in order to explicate the 
argument from IMC, they adopt a folk essentialism about species and moral 
status—more precisely, they adopt naïve developmental essentialism (Benham 
and Haber 2008).  We are under no such obligation, and hold that essentialism, 
even a folk variety, is caustic to understanding the ethics of human-to-nonhuman 
interspecies research.  Indeed, it is this commitment to naïve developmental 
essentialism that is a major source of moral confusion in arguments from IMC, 
not the crossing of species boundaries. 
Benham and Haber (2008, 43) describe naïve developmental essentialism 
as locating the “essence of an entity in its developmental material.”  As in other 
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it is and is found in all and only that kind of entity; being a kind of thing is defined 
by possession of an essence.  Naïve developmental essentialism is analogous to 
genetic essentialism, though rather than locating the essence in genetic material 
or information, it is located in what for convenience we call ‘developmental 
apparatus’. An organism’s (or organ’s, or cell’s, etc.) developmental apparatus 
includes the characteristic species-specific developmental plan, or program, or 
pathway that an organism (organ, cell, etc.) undertakes to become that type of 
organism (organ, cell, etc.). This may include genetic pathways, cell signalling, 
chemical gradients, etc.  On developmental essentialism, then, if some transfer of 
biological material across species includes the relevant developmental 
apparatus, a species-specific essence is transferred as well. On this view, human 
brain stem cells inserted into fetal mice (Greely, et al. 2007) may carry with them 
not just the proteins and cytoplasm characteristic of human neurons, but also the 
characteristically human developmental apparatus. The resultant neurons, then, 
would be considered fundamentally human regardless of how they develop in the 
context of the mouse embryo. That is, the essential identity of those cells is 
identified with their (context-free) development. Developmental essentialism thus 
entails that because these human brain stem cells contain a human 
developmental apparatus, they will produce human neurons, human networks of 
neurons, or, potentially, a functional human brain or network—regardless of what 
features those neurons or brains exhibit!  The identity of the cells remains 
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described above, and the upshot is that for the naïve developmental essentialist, 
the moral identity of an entity is strongly tied to its developmental apparatus. 
Insofar as we mix the developmental apparatus of human and nonhuman 
animals, we risk mixing the moral identity of the resulting creature.  In effect, on 
this view, there is one body but two essences—each assessed by 
incommensurable moral frameworks.  We call this the two-essence problem. 
The two-essence problem, however, is poorly motivated, as it relies on the 
presumption of naïve developmental essentialism.  As with other kinds of species 
essentialism, the lack of empirical or theoretical support for such a stance poses 
a serious problem. For example, there simply are not good data supporting any 
facts of development that are exclusively and universally shared among H. 
sapiens that might function as an essence, and prospects appear slim. Indeed, 
developmental suites are famously widespread across taxa, and redundant within 
them (Carroll 2000).1  The onus is on the essentialist even in case a unique and 
universal developmental apparatus were found in humans, as it is unlikely to be 
necessary to either our moral status or biological identity.  Variation in that 
developmental apparatus would likely be biologically tolerated, e.g., non-lethal 
mutations or developmental plasticity (West-Eberhard 2003) are typically treated 
as sources of variation, not a threat to moral or biological identity.  This suggests 
that the universality of that apparatus was accidental, and as irrelevant as the 
universality of a non-coding stretch of DNA that might be found among all and 
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A second problem with naïve developmental essentialism is that it ignores 
the context in which a cell (or other biological material) develops.  This is a 
function of the commitment to naïve developmental essentialism, and further 
undermines the two-essence problem.  Placing a human-derived cell into mouse 
tissue does not, by necessity, result in that cell developing in the same way as if 
it were in human tissue. Cells respond to signals from the environment, adapting 
or altering their development to the context in which they develop. What is 
characteristic in the development of a cell in one environment may not be 
characteristic of that same cell in a different environment. Thus it is deeply 
misleading to refer to a cell as ‘human’ (or even ‘part-human’) when it is 
developing in a non-human context; to identify it as such threatens to conflate 
origin or derivation with characteristic development in the original context.  In 
effect, this treats development as context-free, while encouraging a conflation of 
‘human’ as a species and ‘human’ as a moral category when pressed into service 
of the two-essence problem.2 
Furthermore, given that many cell functions and processes, including 
many developmental apparatus, are already shared across species, it is no 
surprise to see that cells or tissues transferred from one species to another will 
develop in a fairly predictable fashion. But this is a far cry from the fact that a 
naïve developmental essentialist needs to refer to in support of the moral status 
or biological identity of the resulting organism.  The fact that cells develop 
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essentialism.  The essentialist gets this backwards.  Evolutionary developmental 
biology explanations of the conservation and convergence of development, for 
example, rely on facts of evolutionary relationships and ontogeny (Brakefield 
2006; Shubin, Tabin and Carroll 2009).  Naïve developmental essentialism is a 
competing explanation that ignores, and conflicts with, these facts. 
The focus on developmental apparatus in IMC arguments is not surprising.  
After all, how an organism develops is clearly central to that organism’s identity.  
However, in cross-species mixes, it is a distraction to focus solely on the 
developmental apparatus in consideration of that organism’s identity and moral 
status.  The precise role played by development in determining which species an 
organism belongs to, let alone its moral status, is complicated and, arguably, 
cannot be separated from reproduction (Griesemer 2000).  There are unlikely to 
be clear, uncontroversial answers, and any such discussion will have to draw on 
biological and moral theories. Thus, by focusing exclusively on the 
developmental apparatus, naïve developmental essentialism is too simplistic, 
and ignores how those competing theoretical frameworks might impact our 
conclusions about the biological identity and moral status of animals with human-
derived parts. The details of development matter, as do the details of the 
developmental and moral theories adopted to assess these facts.  These details 
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To recap, on IMC arguments, human-to-nonhuman interspecies research 
produces creatures with one body but two essences.  This creates a conflict 
between the moral frameworks (human and nonhuman) used to determine moral 
status, i.e., the two-essence problem.  On arguments from IMC, the moral divide 
central to the nature of moral justification has been breached, producing 
inexorable moral confusion. But the move to inexorable moral confusion here is 
too fast, as it presumes naïve developmental essentialism.  Even if we accept the 
general precautionary framework of IMC arguments, rejecting naïve 
developmental essentialism undermines the claim that mixing biological materials 
from human and nonhuman animals results in the two-essence problem and, 
thus, an inexorable moral confusion.  After all, if no essences are being 
transferred along with biological material, then the two-essence problem simply 
fails to materialize.  This is not to say the moral status of these creatures will be 
obvious—many questions certainly remain.  Our point is that the presumption of 
essentialism obscures, rather than clarifies, how to pursue answers to those 
questions.  There may be uncertainty about the biological and moral identity of 
the resulting creature, but uncertainty is not the same as confusion.  Confusion, 
in this context, involves a conceptual incommensurability that does not promise 
resolution.  This reflects the flawed conceptual categorization implicit in naïve 
developmental essentialism.  Uncertainty here reflects something else, i.e., our 
epistemic state regarding facts of the matter, and how to apply conceptual 

















anuscript          
University of Utah Institutional Repository  
Author Manuscript 
 14 
absent), yet this need not be inexorably confusing and may even prove fruitful 
and enlightening.  Recognizing this, and rejecting naïve developmental 
essentialism, paves the way to reframing the ethics of cross-species research in 
a more productive way. 
4. Reframing the Ethical Analysis 
Prevailing objections to human-to-nonhuman interspecies research stem 
from IMC arguments.  On these objections, the inexorable moral confusion that 
would result would be so undesirable and constitute such an existential threat as 
to warrant a prohibition (either in part or wholly) against such research.  Above 
we described one motivating presumption of this objection, the two-essence 
problem: animals with human-derived parts would contain two essences in a 
single body.  These essences derive from developmental apparatus, and are 
determinant of moral status.  The moral status of these creatures will be 
indeterminate and/or self-conflicting, and the resultant inexorable moral confusion 
would constitute a precautionary justification against this type of research.   
The presumption of naïve developmental essentialism obscures the 
morally relevant facts and creates confusion, to be certain.  This confusion is the 
result of a flawed ontology that conflates the central biological and moral facts of 
the matter.  Rejecting naïve developmental essentialism avoids the two-essence 
problem, but leaves open the central motivating question: how are we to evaluate 
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turns on what morally relevant features are (or may be) possessed by these 
individuals, not on species identity, and expect that existing ethical frameworks 
will accommodate ethical questions raised by this research.3  What the morally 
relevant features will be will depend, in large part, on what moral theory is 
adopted.4  Disagreements or uncertainties about moral status may still arise, but 
these can be illuminating, even if no clear resolution or consensus emerges.  
More to the point, the disagreements need not be confusing (inexorably or 
otherwise) in the sense presumed by IMC arguments.   
Rather than focus on naïve developmental essentialism, we might instead 
ask after the presumed moral divide between human and nonhuman animals.  
Robert and Baylis identify preservation of this divide as a core motivation in 
arguments from IMC (2003, 2):  
… we explore the strong interest in avoiding any practice that would 
lead us to doubt the claim that humanness is a necessary (if not 
sufficient) condition for full moral standing. 
Call this the necessity condition. We contend it is flawed in at least two ways: (1) 
it is too strong, ultimately weakening the objection; and (2) the concept of 
humanness is ambiguous, and conflating competing senses fatally obscure the 
morally relevant facts.  Addressing these flaws produces our positive 
contribution: a reframing of the ethical discourse. 
First, the necessity condition is unnecessarily strong.  Humanness could 
be weakened to a sufficient condition for full moral consideration without much 
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all those due full moral consideration need be, by necessity, humans.  The 
intuition that all humans, by virtue of being human, warrant full moral 
consideration is retained; yet other creatures may also warrant full moral 
consideration (even if not by sufficiency) and have moral standing. This expands 
the potential pool of those who may qualify for full moral standing, and invites 
discussion of the moral status of both humans and nonhumans. Admittedly, some 
critics may balk at this, preferring the original formulation that extends a 
privileged moral status to humans in terms of an exclusive claim to full moral 
standing.  We think this is too narrow a view, as it rejects by definition the 
possibility of non-human claims to full moral standing.  There may turn out to be 
good reasons to exclude non-humans, but that position ought to be defended 
rather than stipulated.5  We think this position would also ultimately undermine 
possible objections to human/nonhuman interspecies research, e.g., it may be 
unpalatable to those who would otherwise be sympathetic, such as some animal 
rights defenders.  Given the project of identifying the strongest objection to this 
research, we caution against this narrow stance. 
Second, the necessity condition, ostensibly, is about species identity and 
humanness.  However, humanness is ambiguous; consider three possible 
senses:6 
(1) The essence of being human; 
(2) Being human-like; or 
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Working through this ambiguity helps identify how critics of interspecies research 
might reframe their objections. 
The first sense listed above is a non-starter. There is simply no empirical 
support for this brand of essentialism, and the conceptual case for species 
essentialism is weak at best.  The core problem with essentialism in this arena is 
that it typically demands categorization by similarity, whereas evolutionary groups 
must account for variation and dissimilarity 7 (Ereshefsky 2001; Hull 1986; Robert 
and Baylis 2003).  If arguments from IMC rely on this sense, and are the 
strongest candidate objections to human/nonhuman interspecies research, then 
critics of such research are on tenuous grounds at best. 
If we take humanness to mean ‘being human-like’, or ‘exhibits similarity to 
(other) humans’, then what species (if any) an organism belongs to is less 
important than what features that organism possesses.  What those features 
might be, of course, is a question of which features one takes to be morally 
relevant and will be sensitive to the moral framework being pressed into service; 
for example, a utilitarian may look at an organism’s capacity for suffering, 
whereas others may consider degree of autonomy, etc.  We remain neutral on 
which moral framework to adopt.8  Regardless, a solution the two-essence 
problem now presents itself: the moral divide between human and nonhuman 
animals is no longer over what criteria are used to assess moral status, but how 
relevant criteria are expressed or met—there is no incommensurable moral 
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relevantly similar to humans than species membership is a red herring; what 
matters is whether an organism possesses the morally relevant features 
conferring relevant similarity to humans.9  This relocates the moral force of the 
argument from ‘what species does this organism belong to?’ to ‘is this organism 
relevantly similar to humans?’, where what counts as relevantly similar will be 
specified and justified by appeal to moral theory.  An advantage of this approach 
is that it is easy to see how biological facts and moral theory correspond.  The 
normative force will track the relevant biological features of an organism, rather 
than rely on poorly supported categorical notions of species membership (see 
Greene et al. 2005 for an application of this approach). 
Alternatively, we might read humanness to mean ‘belongs to the species 
H. sapiens.’  This is a question about lineages and species identity.  To belong to 
a species is to be an organism in a particular lineage (Ghiselin 1974; Hull 1976).  
For most animal species, the edges and boundaries of lineages are poorly 
resolved; they blend into one another and overlap, and introgression between 
closely related species is common.  In other words, lineages tend to be leaky, 
rather than impermeable.  Species concepts reflect this fact, e.g., the Biological 
Species Concept tolerates low levels of hybridization between species (Coyne 
and Orr 2004). 
H. sapiens is unusual in its distinctiveness from other lineages.  There 
simply are no closely related lineages with which we hybridize.10  The worry, 
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constitute a novel means of creating overlaps between H. sapiens and other 
lineages.  In much the same way that a hybrid duck belongs to both and neither 
of its parents’ species, the concern is that animals with human-derived parts will 
have a similarly indeterminate identity.  In evolutionary biology, this 
indeterminacy may be resolved by appeal to competing species concepts (i.e., 
the infamous ‘species debates’; Ereshefsky 1992), or simply recognized as a fact 
and consequence of biology.  This works fine for evolutionary studies.  However, 
where biological identity is a driver of moral status, as in IMC arguments, this 
indeterminacy poses a foundational threat to moral reasoning (or categorization).  
More specifically, if the bright line separating humans biologically from other 
species may be breached, then so too, perhaps, may that moral divide.  Should 
we be concerned? 
Let’s take stock.  First, it is not clear that the research at stake is creating 
creatures with any claim of belonging to the H. sapiens lineage.  The notions of 
reproduction and development are complicated and controversial, to say the least 
(n.b., Griesemer 2000), and moving parts between species will not necessarily 
create a locus of overlap between those species lineages.  Lateral gene transfer, 
for example, is a widely (and naturally) occurring phenomenon, but not one that 
necessarily complicates species identity.  So, even though the worries raised in 
arguments from IMC are easy to see, it is not obvious they will be borne out—
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Let’s suppose, for sake of argument, that the human/nonhuman chimeras 
produced by interspecies research would constitute a crossing of lineages 
(whatever that might mean).  Suppress, for now, the question of whether moving 
human neural progenitor cells into fetal mice creates a part-human mouse, a 
mouse with human-derived neural tissue, a humanized mouse, or whether these 
are meaningful distinctions to draw (Benham and Haber 2008; Piotrowska 2011).  
Let’s simply treat this as a locus of overlap between the mouse and human 
lineages, i.e., the creature belongs, partially, to both Mus musculus and H. 
sapiens.  The necessity condition tells us how to consider human parts of the 
human lineage, but what of those parts (organismal or otherwise) that are also 
parts of other lineages, and only ‘part-human’? 
As formulated, the necessity condition is not up to the task; a more subtle 
approach is called for.  Recall that Robert and Baylis articulate the necessity 
condition as “the claim that humanness is a necessary (if not sufficient) condition 
for full moral standing” (2003:2, emphasis added).  If the H. sapiens lineage were 
to start resembling other lineages and become more fluid, what becomes of 
‘belongs to H. sapiens’ as a necessary condition for full moral standing?  Notice 
that the ‘belongs to’ relation has been complicated; it may no longer simply be 
understood categorically, but, as with other species, denotes a more complex 
relation.  Does any organism that belongs to the H. sapiens lineage trigger the 
necessity condition, regardless of whether it belongs to other lineages as well?  
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H. sapiens before full (or partial) moral standing is conferred?  In other words, 
should the necessity condition be modified such that exclusive (i.e., non-
overlapping) location in the H. sapiens lineage is a necessary condition for full 
moral standing?  Should any relationship binding an organism into H. sapiens 
trigger the necessity condition, or only genealogical ones?  On the IMC 
presumption of naïve developmental essentialism and a categorical divide 
between human and nonhuman moral standing, these questions will be hidden 
from view.  Arguments from IMC simply lack the resources to locate, let alone 
address, these questions. 
A reassessment of the necessity condition is in order.  We recommend 
that critics of human/nonhuman interspecies research are better off abandoning 
the necessity condition for a weaker stance, what we call the genealogical 
contingency stance (GCS): 
Belonging to the Homo sapiens lineage by virtue of genealogical 
relations is a sufficient condition for full moral consideration; other 
binding relations confer (partial to full) moral status contingent on other 
morally relevant features. 
Inclusion in the H. sapiens lineage by genealogy is sufficient to warrant full moral 
consideration (leaving aside how moral status might be derived from this on 
competing moral theories). What of part-humans?  These partially belong to the 
H. sapiens lineage by virtue of non-genealogical relations, and so their moral 
status will depend, in large part, on what morally relevant features they possess, 
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discussing relations that bind or partially locate individuals in the H. sapiens 
lineage, other relations might also amplify the significance of morally relevant 
features.  For example, we may have greater moral obligations to lab animals or 
house pets, than to wild organisms of the same species.  This greater obligation 
would be justified on the GCS by appeal to the companionship and stewardship 
relations these individuals stand to humans, in that these amplify our moral 
obligation towards, or the moral standing of, those individuals. 
Notice that the two senses of humanness are collapsing in terms of how 
they provide guidance through the ethical issues at stake, and what facts are 
morally relevant.  These facts, though, are often unknowable prior to production of 
these creatures.  There is an inferential gap that cannot be bridged, similar to 
what Robert describes as Xenopus’ paradox (Robert 2006).12  Namely, even if 
we have the tools at hand to assess the moral status of a creature upon 
production, it is the ethics of production that are at stake.  Since this assessment 
is only possible after the fact, production thus carries a genuine moral risk 
(Streiffer 2005 comes to much the same conclusion, though by different means).   
What critics can demand, and proponents must answer, is that this uncertainty of 
moral status be balanced against the possible risk of moral harm that may be 
done to those created individuals.13  This reframes the debate into one of how 
much that uncertainty or moral risk may be mitigated given other facts about 
which we have more solid empirical or theoretical grounding.  That is, it is 
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than from confusion (inexorable or not) about species identity.  This is where we 
think the locus of the debate should rest—what triggers a precautionary attitude, 
and what does that triggering entail?  This is a benefit of our reframing: the 
morally relevant facts are identified without presumption of outcome. 
The upshot is that on either viable reading of humanness—being human-
like, or belonging to H. sapiens—very similar ethical questions may be raised 
against the production of part-humans, questions that no longer rely on a suspect 
biological essentialism.  Though an organism may not possess any essential 
features, critics might argue that genealogical relations between it and H. sapiens 
carry morally significant weight, such that they constitute sufficient conditions for 
full moral consideration.  Genealogical relations depend on reproduction and 
development.  Thus the intuition of the centrality of development to biological 
identity is retained without necessitating commitment to ontologically dubious 
premises, and without worry of unduly amplifying the significance of 
developmental material.  At the same time organisms may possess other morally 
relevant features that may be amplified by non-genealogical relations to the H. 
sapiens lineage. Those relations may be novel, and we may stand in a position of 
uncertainty with regard to how they may be instantiated in the case of production 
of part-humans.  Indeed, it is just this uncertainty that may warrant appeal to the 
precautionary principle—and situates those appeals in a familiar and traditional 
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Above we continued the discussion initiated by Robert and Baylis (2003) over the 
ethics of human-to-nonhuman interspecies research.  We considered the viability 
of objections from IMC, identifying intrinsic flaws in these arguments.  They are 
undermined by the assumption of naïve developmental essentialism and the 
presumption of an incommensurable moral divide between humans and 
nonhumans.  Expunging essentialist assumptions removes a source of confusion 
in IMC arguments: the two-essence problem.  Yet, critics of this research still 
have objections available to them. Rather than motivated by confusion over 
species identity, these reframed objections turn on uncertainty about the moral 
status of the resulting creatures.  This shift better tracks traditional precautionary 
appeals and helps identify the morally significant and relevant facts.  Of course, 
this uncertainty may trigger a variety of precautionary stances, ranging from 
loose regulation to universal prohibition. However, like Robert and Baylis before 
us, we are not endorsing these lines of objection. We present them as stronger 
candidate objections to human-to-nonhuman interspecies research than those 
from IMC, and suggest that their consideration will produce a more fruitful 
discussion.  Whether these objections are forceful enough to justify prohibitions 
or restrictions is an open question, and will depend, for example, on the severity 
of the consequences and scope of benefits (e.g., Bhan et al. 2010). But this is the 
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Arguments from IMC do not simply fail to identify the relevant biological 
and moral facts in play, they distort them. In selecting terminology, biologists and 
ethicists should avoid falling into this same trap.  Describing a mouse with 
human-derived neural tissue as a ‘mouse with a human brain’ undercuts good 
ethical discussions of that work.  This terminology presumes something to be a 
fact, where that fact is very much unsettled; the status of that fact is itself a 
morally relevant feature of the debate.  Furthermore, it fails to account for how 
the same term may be understood in varying contexts.  We endorse a more 
precise yet cautious terminology, e.g., describing creatures as possessing tissue 
derived from human cells or material (e.g., Chang et al. 2010), or “animals with 
human-derived materials” (The Academy of Medical Sciences 2011).  The 
framing of the ethics of human-to-nonhuman interspecies research is not merely 
the concern of policy makers, working groups, and the like, but should also 
resonate with day-to-day practitioners of the research in question.  Given the 
potential value of this research, moral questions should be articulated in a 
manner consistent with good biological thinking yet encourage a productive and 
inclusive ethical discourse among all interested parties.   
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1 Recent empirical work suggests this trend of discovery will continue (Parikh et al. 2010; 
Royo et al. 2011). 
2 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing our attention to this point, and extending 
the preceding point to ‘part-human’ assignment of cells. 
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4 Utilitarian accounts, for example, will apply in familiar ways—and will likely generate 
familiar controversies. Johnston and Eliot (2003) and de Melo-Martin (2008) 
consider how human dignity may pertain here. 
5 How moral consideration due to species identity might play out, of course, is a matter of 
dispute.  See Singer (1975), Francis and Norman (1978) and Tanner (2008) for 
more on the moral relevancy of species identity.  Suffice to say that we do not 
consider moral consideration, moral standing and moral status to be equivalent. 
6 These correspond, roughly, to competing views about species and natural kinds, e.g., 
naïve typology, sophisticated pheneticism, and evolutionary accounts. 
7 The best case for an exception to this would be an extrinsic essentialism, with essential 
characters extrinsic to the individual, e.g., origin essentialism (Griffiths 1999; 
Okasha 2002).  We do not think this is the sense of essence being described here.  
Even if it were, the two-essence problem would be undermined for reasons already 
discussed.  Robert and Baylis consider another option, Richard Boyd’s 
Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) Kinds (Boyd 1999).  The HPC view is not the 
right kind of essentialism; there is no essence but a cluster of homeostatic 
properties, not all of which need be applied and may vary over different contexts.  
Yet another option would be to adopt a teleological version of essentialism.  The 
best candidate is Denis Walsh’s (2006) resurrection of Aristotelian essentialism, 
yet this account would almost certainly undermine naïve developmental 
essentialism.  Devitt (2008) attempts to resurrect species essentialism, though it is 
unclear whether his account would support the necessity condition. Barker (2010) 
offers a convincing critique of Devitt-style essentialism.  Sober (1980) addresses 
how debates over the nature of essentialism, natural kinds, and variation play out 
with regard to an evolutionary account of species. 
8 Moral theories, of course, will differ in how individuals who fail to possess species-
typical morally relevant features ought to be treated (e.g., anencephalic newborns).  
Our view has the advantage that it allows space for this complex debate, rather 
than settling it by presupposition.  (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing 
this to our attention.) 
9 Sagoff (2007) and Piotrowska (2011) consider an additional dimension: the relevance 
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be morally relevant that a mouse’s enhanced capacity for some character was due 
to certain cells being derived from transferred human neural stem cells as opposed 
to dolphin neural stem cells, if that capacity were identical in either case. 
10 At least no extant lineages! 
11 One significant exception bears mentioning.   Some part-humans could be born, e.g., 
by manipulation of germ-line cells in nonhumans, or as a result of a mating 
between two part-humans produced by research.  In these cases, part-humans 
might belong, partial or otherwise, to the H. sapiens lineage by virtue of 
genealogical (i.e., developmental and reproductive) relations.  Should this 
production raise greater ethical concerns than production through non-genealogical 
methods?  If so (see Academy of Medical Sciences 2011), the GCS could explain 
and perhaps justify a stricter prohibition on production of these sorts of part-
humans.  Alternatively, drawing a moral divide between part-humans based on 
mode of origin may well undermine something like a GCS stance, in much the 
same way we have argued that arguments from IMC are ultimately untenable. 
12 To know what features a chimera or hybrid might possess, we might first need to 
produce a creature halfway between the chimera/hybrid and one of the progenitor 
species.  Of course, to know what features this creature might posses (and, thus, 
to determine its moral status) the inferential gap must also be filled, perhaps by 
creation of some other interspecies creature, and so on ad infinitum. 
13 This is reminiscent, with obvious added dimensions, of debates over the production of 
human clones that consider the moral harm that may be done to that clone, e.g., 
can a child born as a result of cloning be said to be harmed by being brought into 
existence, or do some harms that may accompany cloning justify prohibition (Brock 


















anuscript          
University of Utah Institutional Repository  
Author Manuscript 
